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The 90 days that have passed since the last "Current Decisions" have
not been 90 days that shook the world in the field of constitutional law. Nevertheless, at least two decisions on volatilc subjects justify comment beyond a
description of the judgments and facts. One of these, Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 69 S. Ct., 894, involving the function of "freedom of speech" will be
reserved for another issue.
A Schizophrenic Marriage and a Divisible Divorce
The case of Rice v. Rice, 69 S. Ct. 751, is a further exploration by the.
court of the obligation of a state to give full faith and credit to the divorce
decrees of another state. It is a smug, logical consequence of the doctrine
set out in the Williams cases, in a context of reality where people leave their
permanent residences to change their homes, spouses or both.
In the Rice case the following facts were before the court: After 20 years
of married life in Connecticut, Herbert Rice went to Reno, Nevada and
started an action for divorce. The complaint and process were handed his
wife Lillian at her home in Connecticut. She neither appeared personally nor
participated in the trial in Nevada and Herbert was there awarded a decree
of divorce. Whereupon he wired Hermoine to join him and they immediately
married in Reno, retained a room there, obtained employment in California
and shortly thereafter Herbert died. Lillian then brought an action for a
declaratory judgment in Connecticut to have herself declared the widow of
Herbert, at least insofar as the Connecticut real estate was involved. After
a full trial, judgment was entered for Lillian and the Connecticut court found
that Herbert had never established a bona fide domicile in Nevada. This was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut upon the authority of Williams
v. North Carolina,65 S. Ct. 1092.
The Supreme Court of the United States determined but one issue: Did
Connecticut discharge the duty of respect it owed the Nevada decree under
the rule of the second Williams case? In a short detached opinion the Supreme
Court concluded that the burden placed upon Lillian of proving that the
decedent had not established domicile in Nevada was fairly met and was amply
supported by evidence, that the court could not re-try the facts nor. would it
impute that the Connecticut court was unwarranted in denying full faith
and credit to the Nevada decree. Thus, so far as property in Connecticut was
concerned Lillian was still the widow of Herbert and entitled to inherit this
property. The Court did not speak about the interest of Connecticut in pro-
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tecting one of its resident citizens who may have been abandoned or left
impoverished-it merely said, "this is but the Williams case." One wonders
how Hermoine, who married Herbert in reliance upon the Nevada decree,
accepted the decision of the omni-present umpire who hovers over these proceedings in the state courts. How "psychotic" is this marriage when the
courts permit her to be Herbert's wife but she cannot be his widow!
The Williams Cases Revisited
The decision in the Rice case is but a logical outgrowth of the
Williams cases. In the first Williams case, Williams v. North Carolina, 63 S.
Ct. 207, a quick Nevada divorce where one of the parties has established
domicile is held conclusive and entitled to full faith and credit. The wrong
or fault of the person who leaves his spouse and establishes such domicile is
immaterial to jurisdiction. Under the second Williams case, Williams v. North
Carolina, 65 S. Ct. 1092, the decree is vulnerable to attack and the full faith
and credit clause does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court
whose judgment is relied upon in another state, even though the decree recites
that there was jurisdiction. North Carolina, it is held, in protection of its
institutions, may independently examine the question of Nevada's jurisdiction
but its findings must be amply supported by evidence.
Many serious questions were left unanswered by these two cases: Thus,
may all of the other states as well as the state of matrimonial domicile question
the jurisdictional fact? Does the jurisdictional fact become conclusive for all
purposes where the spouses contested the issue of jurisdiction or appeared and
were afforded the opportunity to litigate such issue? What shall we say of
the subsidiary rights which are usually attached to the status of a marriagerights of property, support, custody, inheritance? Shall they be determined
by the court which entered the decree of divorce as in the Williams case or
is it open for other states upon re-examining the jurisdictional fact of domicile
to decide such questions?
The connective tissues to the doctrine in the Williams case were soon
formed in the following cases: It seemed clear from Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 S.
Ct. 1087 and Coe v. Coe, 68 S. Ct. 1094 that where both parties have participated in a divorce proceeding and were given full opportunity to contest
the jurisdictional issue, the full faith and credit clause precludes the courts
of a sister state from subjecting such decree to collateral attack by relitigating
the question of jurisdiction. In Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 65 S. Ct. 1118,
a Pennsylvania court refused to strike down a support order imposed upon
the husband who thereafter went to Nevada and obtained a divorce. The
Pennsylvania court denied the jurisdiction of the Nevada court and the
Supreme Court refused to re-try the facts. In that case the court merely
followed the Williams case but it foretold an important development. "It is
not apparent", said Justice Douglas, "that the spouse who obtained the decree
can defeat an action for maintenance or support in another state by, showing
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that he was domiciled in the state which awarded him the divorce decree ...I
am not convinced that in the absence of an appearance or personal service the
decree need be given full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance or
support of the other spouse or the children".
The Concept of The "Divisible Divorce"
In Estin v. Estin, 68 S. Ct. 1213, the concept of "divisible divorce" is
clarified and the doctrine applied--a divorce may be good to end a marriage
but not good when ii affects dpendent property rights. In that case the
husband and wife resided in New York. The husband deserted her and in an
action for separation she was awarded permanent alimony. The husband then
moved to Nevada and later obtained a divorce there. His wife was notified
by constructive service but did not appear. Having stopped his payments he
was later sued in a New York court for unpaid alimony and in defense he
set up his Nevada decree. The importance of the case is that New York conceded that husband had established a bona fide residence in Nevada when
he procured his divorce there. It would therefore follow that so far as the
marriage itself was concerned it had been dissolved and its dissolution was
entitled to full faith and credit, but the New York court held that in New
York the support order would survive the divorce decree. The Supreme Court
agreed. It held that because the marriage relationship had ended did not mean
that every other legal incident of the marriage had necessarily ended. New
York had clearly an interest in the welfare of its own citizens and was rightfully concerned with the problem of the wife's livelihood and support. Nevada's
dissolution of the marriage, though binding in lawfully separating the husband
and wife, could not affect the support order decreed by the New York court
since the wife had not been personally served in Nevada. The New York
judgment for support was held an intangible property interest which could
not be stricken in Nevada by a proceeding in which there had not been personal
service or the appearance of the wife. The court, therefore, sanctioned the
Nevada decree insofar as it affected the marital status but held it ineffective
on the issue of alimony.
To return to Rice v. Rice-it should be noted the court does not base
its decision upon its concern for the interests of Connecticut in the welfare
of its citizens. The Connecticut court found that the Nevada decree was not
entitled to full faith and credit because Herbert was-not then domiciled there.
The case is more like Esenwein v. Commonwealth rather than Estin v. Estin.
What would the court have said had Herbert died intestate leaving property
in California and Texas. Could these states independently inquire into the
jurisdictional facts of the Nevada decree? Would they be bound by the Connecticut declaratory judgment?
Changing a Legal Concept to Match Social Realities?
The Rice case shows us how far we bave departed from traditional concepts. iA our patterns of thinking, rights to alimony or support, rights of
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dower or inheritance have seemed like logical necessities and essential ingredients of marriage. But we know that these rights need not be inexorably
attached to marriage and under certain circumstances, as the cases show, may
not be lost though marriage has been dissolved. To many people a "divisible
divorce" will not make sense. Marriage, traditionally, means not just consortium, but also all of the subsidiary rights that have always been part of the
marriage institution. It is true that there are far-reaching changes in the
family pattern. Changes in economic life have affected family life. Most of
the traditional functions of the family have been taken over by other institu,
tions and sociologists speak of the modern family pattern as one in which re,
production and individual personality development remain the sole functions.
Perhaps the decisions discussed reflect these changes. In a society "mobile
and nomadic" as Justice Jackson characterized it, where one may with ease
abandon his spouse and live elsewhere, and our values of marriage and responsibility have changed, it may be realistic to regard a marriage valid for
one purpose and invalid for another. At least the decision emphasizes the
great need for reconsidering the basic problem. What is our objective when
the state grants a divorce? Is the purpose to release one's spouse from an
intolerable personal situation or are we dealing with an indivisible status
involving important social factors, such as inheritance, children, property
rights, etc. In the absence of a uniform divorce law, it is possible that we can
judically treat these various aspects of the marriage relationship separately?

Thirteen District Judges Accept Retirement Plan
A Correction of the Judiciary Committee Report
By PHILIP S. VAN CISE, Chairman
In the June DICTA, page 143, 1 erroneously stated that the district judges
at a meeting on June 4 found the retirement bill as passed by the legislature,
was defective and they "repudiated it in toto". In writing this statement I
carelessly relied upon a two-column article in the Rocky Mountain News of
June 5 stating "State Judges Reject New Retirement Law." Any lawyer
should know that the average reporter does not understand legal matters, and
should go to the judges for the facts rather than the papers. So I apologize for
the same and am sending a correction to the district judges, county judges in
counties over 20,000 and the members of the General Assembly.
The facts as now obtained from the judges and Tom Trumble, the reporter
at the meeting, are that the judges agreed to become subject to the act, but
hoped it could be later amended in some respects so that it would more fully
cover their requirements. Hu Henry reports that to date 13 district judges have
sent in their acceptances to the State Employees Retirement Board and only
one has rejected it.

